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The Impact of SFAS 123R on CEO Equity Compensation 
 
Abstract 
In December of 2004, FASB released SFAS 123R, mandating the expensing of 
executive stock options. This paper studies the changes that occurred in CEO equity 
compensation in the period of 2000 to 2006. Complementary, I analyze the relevance of 
performance conditions in this form of compensation. There are two main findings: (i) 
in the post-SFAS 123R period executive stock options determinants become different 
(ii) the use of performance equity grants contributes to the decrease of traditional stock 
options, since the use of these type of grants has a statistically impact in the decrease of 
traditional stock options grants between 2006 and 2003. There are also two side-results: 
(i) before SFAS 123R stock options drivers were explaining CEO total compensation, in 
the post-rule period total compensation drivers became less similar to stock options 
ones (ii) there is a significant difference between stock options and restricted stock 
drivers, that persist even after SFAS 123R be introduced. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1990s there was an explosion of executive stock options grants as 
compensation and incentive tools. Over this decade, th  value of options granted 
increased from an average of $22 million per company to $238 million per company by 
2000. This increase has occurred across a wide range of industries but especially in 
HiTech and Telecommunication firms (Hall and Murphy [2003]). Through this financial 
instrument it was possible to align shareholders and managers interests without the need 
to record the compensation expense on the firms’ financial statements. The combination 
of a stock market in overdrive and favorable accounting treatment made stock options 
the “crack cocaine of incentives” (Lavelle [2005]) and the lack of stock option 
expensing created an uneven playing field for virtually all other forms of executive 
compensation that required expensing (Murphy [2002]). Meanwhile, the financial press 
started to question whether stock options rewarded ex cutives for their own merit or for 
the market success (Johnson and Tian [2000]). Consequently, firms initiated efforts to 
tie compensation to performance more closely, using other forms of compensation, like 
restricted stock grants and performance options. 
The current accounting standard for stock options, which requires options 
expensing, is SFAS 123R (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.123, 
Revised).  The main idea behind SFAS 123R is that expensing stock options enhances 
the transparency of option-based compensation, making it harder for managers to use 
them to hide their excessive pay (Core et al. [2003]). However, firms were not 
interested in taking a hit to their earnings numbers and several firms have accelerating 
the vesting periods of their outstanding options before the issuance of SFAS 123R 
looking to reduce the recognized expense in the future (Choudhary et al. [2006]). This 
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adds controversy to the long time debate on whether CEO compensation is the result of 
inefficient pay without performance (Bebchuck and Fried [2004] and Core et al. 
[2004]). 
Empirical evidence suggests that in practice restricted stock has been rarely used 
due to the previous stock options accounting advantages (Brow and Lee [2007] and 
Carter et al. [2007]). The past infrequent use of restricted stock, even though various 
models predict the preference for restricted stock ver stock options (Lambert and 
Larcker [2004]), calls for research in what concerns the impacts of SFAS 123R in the 
choice between stock options and restricted stock, hence after this rule stock options no 
longer have favorable accounting treatment. 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the change in factors associated 
with firms’ decisions to grant stock options after the introduction of SFAS 123R. One of 
the factors considered is the existence of performance conditions in new grants. 
Concurrently, this study examines if these factors are also driving the decisions on 
restricted stock grants and on CEO total compensation.  
In my study I develop two main hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that the 
determinants of stock options grants have changed aft r SFAS 123R, given that other 
studies report a significant decrease in the use of stock options in anticipation of SFAS 
123R (Brow and Lee [2007] and Carter et al. [2007]). In line with critics of traditional 
options over the use of performance-based equity compensation, hypothesis 2 predicts 
an increase in performance equity grants, associated with the decrease of traditional 
stock options. I also test two side-results: (i) assuming that the overcompensation 
problem in the U.S. was caused by the excess use of tock options, I assess whether 
stock options drivers can explain CEO total compensation levels, before and after SFAS 
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123R (ii) I investigate in what terms stock options and restricted stock drivers are 
different, since there has been an abusive use of stock options and an infrequent use of 
restricted stock.   
I use a sample of 385 firms from the S&P 500 from 2000 to 2006, with 
necessary data for Execucomp and Compustat variables and for Bebchuck 
Entrenchment Index (Bebchuck et al. [2004]). Additionally, in order to analyze the 
impact of performance equity grants, I use the Statement of Changes of Beneficial 
Ownership of Securities (Form 4) that contains information about the type of options 
and stock grants given to the companies’ CEOs1. 
 Empirical findings do not reject hypothesis 1 and reveal that the explanatory 
variables for stock options use change after SFAS 123R. Results suggest that the 
increase in option performance grants have a significa t impact in the decrease of 
traditional stock options which is consistent with hypothesis 2. As for the side-results, I 
find evidence that stock options drivers do not explain the use of restricted stock; even 
after SFAS 123R was introduced. Regarding CEO total compensation, hypothesized 
stock options drivers were in fact explaining CEO total compensation, however after 
SFAS 123R introduction CEO total compensation determinants became less similar to 
stock options ones. Consistent with Carter et al. (2007) I find no evidence of an impact 
of SFAS 123R on the level of CEO total compensation, only in the composition of total 
compensation. In fact the composition of CEO compensation bears dramatic changes 
upon mandatory expensing of executive stock options. I  line with Brow and Lee 
(2007) I find that after SFAS 123R there is a signif cant decrease in the use of stock 
options as part of total compensation (- 21.0%), while CEO total compensation levels 
                                                           
1 Performance data was collected by Professors Ana Marques, Ana Albuquerque and Ivy Zhang and begins in 2003. 
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remains the same and the other types of compensatio, namely restricted stock, increase 
their prevalence as part of CEO compensation (8.0%). These results are evidence for the 
new rule potential to alter the effective design of CEO compensation that finally 
demands more thought than simply awarding “plain vailla” options. 
This paper contributes to the existent literature by using 2 years of post-SFAS 
123R data, by assessing changes in factors affecting stock options grants after the 
issuance of SFAS 123R and analyzing the relevance of these factors on restricted stock 
and total compensation. Furthermore, the paper alsoinvestigates the impact of 
performance equity grants, which are seen as a moreeffective way to provide incentives 
to executives, in the decrease of traditional stock options. This paper is close in spirit to 
Carter et al. (2007) who study the role of accounting in the design of CEO equity 
compensation by assessing the relevance of financial reporting concerns on stock 
options, restricted stock and total compensation; and lso examine the change in CEO 
compensation levels upon voluntary decision to expense stock options. My paper 
extends the past literature since I am able to ascertain the changes in CEO compensation 
after SFAS 123R effective date of implementation for all companies, not only for 
voluntary adopters, and also to investigate how stock options drivers (both types - real 
economic drivers of stock options and the determinants associated to the past 
accounting advantages) change after the new rule imple entation and how they are 
determining decisions on restricted stock and CEO total compensation. Complementary, 
I analyze the impact of performance equity grants on the use of traditional stock 
options, adding empirical evidence on the use of performance based pay in U.S. that is 
limited contrary to the research on traditional stock ptions and restricted stock. Also, 
following Brow and Lee (2007), who investigate the impact of SFAS 123R through a 
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change model that identifies factors driving stock options cut back upon mandatory 
expensing, I aim at study the impact of SFAS 123R on equity-based compensation by 
assessing the impacts of this rule in CEO equity compensation using different models to 
assess the effect of changes in stock options determinants after SFAS 123R effective 
date on stock options, restricted stock and total compensation.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discus es relevant background 
regarding SFAS 123R and previous literature. Section 3 presents the sample selection 
and descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 develop my two hypotheses, their variables 
definitions, research designs and results. Section 6 shows complementary analysis and 
section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1. SFAS 123R  
Before the issuance of SFAS 123R, accounting for executive stock options was 
ruled by Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25 and by SFAS 123. APB 
Opinion 25 was first released in 1972, before the publication of the Black-Scholes 
model and it motivated the use of the intrinsic value method to value executive stock 
options on the option grant date. At the time, most of the firms were granting at-the
money options since for such options the intrinsic value was zero and so there was no 
compensation cost reported in firms’ income statements. This omission in financial 
statements distorted financial conditions and operations of firms issuing executive stock 
options (Choudhary [2006]). In 1995 FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) 
issued SFAS 123. This accounting rule motivated the expensing of executive stock 
options using the fair value method, but allowed the recognition of the intrinsic value, 
as long as firms disclosed the fair value numbers on a pro forma basis in the footnotes to 
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their financial statements. FASB originally intended to require the fair value method, 
but the opposition to this method was heavily intense and instead of following the 
established standard companies continued to use the intrinsic value method presented in 
APB Opinion 25. Finally, in December 2004, within the environment of financial, 
accounting and backdating scandals, FASB approved SFAS 123R, which revised SFAS 
123 and suppressed APB Opinion 25. Under SFAS 123R, firms are required to select a 
valuation model to determine the fair value of executive stock options on the grant day 
and to recognize this compensation expense in their income statements during the 
vesting period of the options. The SFAS 123R effectiv  date of implementation for 
public entities that do not file as small business issuers was the beginning of the first 
interim or annual reporting period that begins after June 20052.  
There were four main reasons for SFAS 123R issuance: (1) FASB had to do 
something in order to restore investors’ confidence i  the transparency and in the high 
quality of financial reporting; (2) in February 2004, International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) issued a new standard that obligates th  expensing of stock options by the 
firms that use IAS (IFRS 2 – Share-based Payment), thus there was an urgent need to 
improve the convergence and comparability of international accounting and financial 
reporting; (3) simplifying the accounting principles by requiring a single method for 
expensing executive stock options, so that all entiti s follow the same accounting 
standard and (4) enabling the comparability of repoted financial information by 
eliminating the alternative accounting methods (SFA 123R [2004]). 
Opponents to the fair value method argued several rasons to avoid reporting 
compensation expenses associated to stock options. First, that it may represent a hit to 
                                                           
2 For public entities that file as small business issuers and for nonpublic entities the effective dat was as of the beginning of the 
first interim or annual report period that begins after December 2005. 
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the companies’ earnings, especially to high technology firms3. A research report by 
Credit Suisse First Boston in 2006 estimated that expensing of options compensation 
cost would reduce the S&P 500 EPS estimate by approximately 3% and that sectors like 
technology would be even more affected. Second, opponents defend that stock options 
expensing would imply a decrease in stock options grants, for firms this means lower 
capacity to attract, retain and motivate employees (CCG Investors Relations [2006]). 
Finally, there is the inappropriate use of option pricing models for options that are not 
marketable and are held by undiversified and risk-averse executives, as managers need 
to estimate volatility as an input to the option pricing models. 
Firms’ reactions to the discussion on the need to expense stock options were 
diverse. Many firms voluntary expensed stock options before SFAS 123R was 
approved. Coca-Cola, Ford, General Electric, McDonald’s, Microsoft and PepsiCo are 
among the companies that have expensed stock options early, aiming to appear “socially 
responsible at a time when corporate credibility was being widely questioned” (The 
2006 TOP 250: “Long term incentives and grant practices for executives”)4. Others 
have accelerated the vesting of their options in order to avoid recognizing fair value 
expense in the future financial statements5. Choudhary (2006) finds that accelerating 
vesting initiatives were especially prevailing and had a negative stock price reaction in 
companies with bad corporate governance, since investors perceived such transactions 
as managerial intent to deceive shareholders for managers’ private benefit. Furthermore, 
                                                           
3 “Many Silicon Valey companies still see stock opti ns as a vital part of the entrepreneurial culture th y seek to foster.” (Said     
[2006]). 
4 General Electric, for example, has trimmed its equity grants from 47 million shares in 2002 to 38 million in 2003 by replacing 
60% of its options grants with restricted stock, since stock is  more valuable than options,  thus firms can grant fewer shares, 
reducing the dilution cost to shareholders (Lavelle [2005]). 
5 In March 2003, FASB announced the intention to readdress the issue of accounting for stock options and that would possible 
release an exposure draft before the end of the year (Brown and Lee [2007]). 
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accelerating vesting was less predominant in firms that voluntary recognized options 
expense earlier. The expensing anticipation and the accelerating vesting movements 
occurred mainly during 2003 and 2004, which are considered the SFAS 123R 
transaction years (Carter et al. [2007] and Brown and Lee [2007]). 
2.2. Literature Review 
Empirical evidence suggests that the accounting advantage of executive stock 
options has led firms to use them instead of other forms of compensation, seeking the 
reduction of compensation expense to boost reported earnings and not to take advantage 
from the real economic benefits of options such as motivation and retention of 
employees. Brown and Lee (2007) show a reduction in abnormal compensation and an 
improvement in operating performance after stock options cutbacks. The motivation for 
the past behaviors were the pre-SFAS 123R equity incentives that tempted managers to 
increase stock prices in the short run hunting for higher earnings, changing financial 
reporting statements that modified real economic transactions and led to the loss of real 
economic value (Choudhary [2006]). To meet earnings benchmarks, managers altered 
the proportion of compensation from options under th  so famous “accounting subsidy 
to stock options” and generated an excess use of stock options (Bodie et al. [2003]). 
There are those who defend the disposal of stock-based compensation and the existence 
of compensation on the basis of real and long term earnings growth as if firms were not 
publicity traded (Martin [2003]). 
Empirical evidence also suggests that in practice restricted stock was rarely used 
due to mangers obsession for stock options’ favorable ccounting treatment.  Carter et 
al (2007) find results confirming that financial reporting costs played a significant role 
determining CEO compensation, suggesting that pre-SFAS 123R favorable accounting 
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treatment for stock options led to a preference use of options and to a lower use of 
restricted stock. Hall and Murphy (2002) also suggest that an important missing factor 
in existing models of the choice between stock options and restricted stock was the 
favorable accounting treatment for stock options. 
One can think that, while the abusive use of stock options means lower reported 
expenses it was also costly, because, due to risk aversion managers demand a higher 
risk premium for receiving stock options, valuing stock options below their true 
economic cost for the firm (Hall and Murphy [2002]). On the contrary, Hodge et al. 
(2006) prove that on average managers overvalue stock options relative to the Black-
Scholes value and to the fair value equivalent restricted stock grant. 
After the issuance of SFAS 123R, there is no longer an uneven playing field for 
stock options and firms are shifting away from stock ptions towards restricted stock 
and performance awards. Brown and Lee (2007) show that, on average, firms cut back 
stock options for their top five executives by 30% in 2005 and that companies are more 
likely to replace stock options with restricted stock in the post-expensing period. These 
results suggest that firms took advantage of stock ptions preferential accounting 
treatment to window dress financial statements in the pre-expensing period. 
Nonetheless, other authors (Yermack [1995] and Bryan et al. [2000]) detect no evidence 
of a relation between financial reporting costs andthe use of stock options.  Also, while 
the financial press claimed that firms, in response to SFAS 123R, replaced executive 
stock options by restricted stock or cash (Said [2006]), some financial economists 
questioned whether stock options new accounting treatm nt affects options-based 
compensation, since before the issuance of SFAS 123R investors and analysts already 
had this information in the pro forma disclosures (Oyer and Schafer [2005]).  
12 
 
Additionally, investors, academics and boards members have manifested their 
apprehension regarding the insufficient incentives around stock options and restricted 
stock awards with simple time vesting provisions6. This has led critics of traditional 
stock options and activist stakeholders to suggest that both option and stock awards 
should contain performance-based vesting conditions, ba ed on managers’ capacity to 
reach certain targets as stock market, accounting, or other performance targets, (an 
index or a comparison group, in the case of relative performance measures). Several 
studies have proved that on theory performance options are better in incentives, 
management retention and gauging managerial talent, since only high talent managers 
will be willing to take this kind of risk (Johnson and Tian [2000], Arya and Mittendorf 
[2005] and Bettis et al. [2008]). However, empirical evidence in this field is 
inconclusive. Gerakos et al. (2005) shows that performance options are used by firms 
with weak corporate governance to minimize the criticism around the issuance of large 
grants of stock options to deceive stakeholders rathe  han to improve managerial  
incentives, through the use of easily achievable performance targets. Contrary, the 
results of Bettis et al. (2008) tend to reject this “stakeholder-placation” theory in favor 
of incentive, retention and gauging managerial talent theories. 
3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics7 
Panel A of Table 1 shows how the final sample was reached. I start with 3,189 
observations from Execucomp, which correspond to the period of 2000 until 2006 for 
the S&P 500 firms. I next exclude 221 observations because of missing data from 
                                                           
6 See Bebchuck and Fried (2004) for a critique of simple time vested equity awards. Furthermore, Warren Buffet postulated on the 
state of affairs in his 1998 letter to shareholders: "Though options, if properly structured, can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way 
to compensate and motivate top managers, they are mo often wildly capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as 
motivators and inordinately expensive for shareholders."  Finally, CalPERS (2003) states that it will not support any executive 
compensation plan that does include a significant prt of performance or indexed options. 
7 All the subsequent variables definitions and data sources are presented in Appendix A. 
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Compustat and 273 observations because of missing corporate governance data 
(Bebchuck Entrenchment Index). The sample consists of 2,695 observations, which 
comprise data for 385 firms. For each of these 385 firms on each year the compensatio  
data is referent to the firms’ CEOs. The industry classification is displayed in Panel B of 
Table 1 where I segregate the sample firms according to Execucomp industry variable 
SPINDEX, which is the four-digit code that identifies the companies’ industry sector. 
The sample firms comprehend 24 different industries. Capital Goods (8.3%), Utilities 
(7.8%) and Energy (7.3%) are the industries with higher weight on the sample, 
Automobiles & Components (0.5%) and Real State (0.8%) are the least prevalent 
industries. Columns 5, 6 and 7 exhibit the mean industry changes on stock options, 
restricted stock and total compensation between the pre and post-SFAS 123R periods. 
As pre-SFAS 123R period I consider the mean values from 2000, 2001 and 2002 and 
for the period post-SFAS 123R I count with the mean v lues from 2005 and 2006. This 
way I take out the anticipation and accelerating vesting effects occurred in 2003 and 
20048. Columns 8 and 9 present the change on the ratio of stock options over total 
compensation and on the ratio of restricted stock over total compensation. 
Telecommunication Services (-83.5%), Technology Hardw re & Equipment (-83.0%) 
and Media (-74.6%) are the industries with larger decreases in the value of stock options 
grants. These results were expected since “Silicon Valey” firms were the ones using 
stock options in excess (Said [2006]). The average industry change in stock options for 
the sample is -35.0%, which is evidence for the expected decrease in stock options 
                                                           
8 The SFAS 123R effective date of implementation for big companies is June 2005. Given that almost  all of the sample firms 
(89%) have report periods after June 2005, I considered both 2005 and 2006 as the periods after SFAS 123R. Another important 
note is that the Execucomp report format for the variable used for total compensation (TDC1) has changed in 2006 and in the new 
format the value of restricted stock grants appears included in the stock awards fair value. Thus, the segregated value of restricted 
stock grants in 2006 is missing and in the post-SFA 123R period the variable restricted stock comprehends only values for 2005.  
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grants after SFAS 123R. Regarding the change in restrict d stock grants, there is a wide 
variation across the industries, since the majority of sample firms increase significantly 
the restricted stock grants and even initiate this types of grants only after SFAS 123R. 
The sample average of changes in restricted stock grants is 402.0%. This number is 
strongly influenced by the change in the Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 
industry, which was of 5,642.5%. The sample mean industry changes in total 
compensation is 13%, which represents an increase in total compensation after the 
implementation of SFAS 123R. Concerning the last two columns, the average industry 
percentage change of stock options as part of total c mpensation declines 21.0% and the 
average industry percentage change on the ratio of  restricted stock over total 
compensation increases 8.0%, thus after SFAS 123R the distribution of  CEO total 
compensation components changes. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the sample. Panel A shows the means 
for stock options, restricted stock and total compensation for the pre and post-SFAS 
123R periods and also the mean for the percentage of stock options and restricted stock 
over total compensation9. The differences in stock options and restricted stock means are 
statistically significant, and in line with Brown and Lee (2007) findings, reveal a 
decrease in the use of stock options and an increase in the use of restricted stock, after 
SFAS 123R. Consistent with Carter et al. (2007) the difference in the mean of total 
compensation is not significant, indicating that the passage of SFAS 123R is not 
associated with a change in total compensation levels. The mean change in the 
percentage of stock options as part of total compensation from 53.7% to 28.6% in the 
post-SFAS 123R period is significant and the increase in the weight of restricted stock 
                                                           
9 The pre-SFAS 123R period corresponds to the average of 2000, 2001 and 2002 values. The post-SFAS 123R period stands for the 
average values of  2005 and 2006. 
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on total compensation from 7.9% to 15.4% is also significant, which is evidence for the 
change in CEO total compensation distribution after SFAS 123R. 
Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the evolution of CEO total compensation from 
2000 to 2006, segregating the percentages of total compensation in stock options, 
restricted stock, bonus, salary and the remaining components of total compensation 
grouped and named as other10. In 2000 CEO total compensation was mainly made of 
stock options (67.0%), while bonus (11.0%), salary (7.0%), restricted stock (7.0%) and 
other components (8.0%) constituted small percentags of total compensation. During 
2001 and 2002 the distribution of total compensation bear small alterations, but from 
2003 on, the constitution of total compensation is considerably different. Throughout 
the sample years, stock options lose weight on total compensation and the other 
components of total compensation increase their prevalence, specially restricted stock. 
In 2006 stock options represents only 16.0% of total compensation, while stock awards 
counts for 52.0%. 
Panel C of Table 2 exhibits descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical models, for the entire sample period. These statistics indicate a diversified 
sample, where for instance the mean (median) for T_ Assets is $35,800,000 thousand 
($9,402,160 thousand) and the correspondent standard eviation is $109,000,000 
thousand. The mean (median) for stock options grants is $5,080 thousand ($2,480 
thousand) and the mean (median) for restricted stock grants is $1,153 thousand ($0 
                                                           
10 In Panel B of Table 2, Total Compensation (Execucomp variable TDC1) from 2000 to 2005 comprises the following: Total 
Value of Stock Options Granted using the Black-Scholes Value (Options BLS), Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted (RS), 
Salary, Bonus and Other.  
In 2006 TDC1 comprises: Grant Date Fair Value of Options Awards (Options Awards FV), Salary, Bonus, Grant Date Fair Value of 
Stock Awards (Stock Awards FV) and Other. 
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thousand) since the prevalence of restricted stock is fairly small in the first sample 
years.  
Panel D of Table 2 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrixes of 
the stock options models’ variables. The correlations reveal that some of these variables 
have unexpected signs11. The Spearman correlations signs of independent variables with 
stock options that are statistically different from the predict signs hypothesized in 
Appendix A are 1YrReturn and E_Index. Regarding the P arson correlation 
coefficients, E_Index shows a sign correlation with stock options contrary to the 
predictions. Nevertheless, it is the use of OLS regressions in the subsequent models that 
establishes the significance of these correlations with stock options. 
4. The Change in Factors Explaining the Use of Executive Stock Options  
4.1. Hypothesis Development and Variable Definitions 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the change in factors associated 
with firms’ decisions to grant stock options after he introduction of SFAS 123R. For 
this purpose, I identify different factors which I believe influence firms’ decisions to 
grant executive stock options in the period before SFAS 123R and then assess whether 
they continue to drive stock options use in the post-SFAS 123R period. These factors 
can be classified into two groups: (i) justified real conomic benefits of stock options, 
the relevance of which I expect to increase and (ii) factors associated with the excess 
use of options due to the previous accounting advantages - in this case, I hypothesize 
these factors will lose importance after the effective date of SFAS 123R. Therefore 
hypothesis 1 is, in alternative form:  
                                                           
11 The expected signs correlations between the independent variables used latter in the research models and stock options are 
displayed in Appendix A. 
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H1: The factors explaining the use of executive stock ptions change after SFAS 
123R is introduced. 
I next discuss how I expect the relevance of the factors identified as 
determinants of compensation via stock options to change from the pre-SFAS 123R 
period to the period after the new rule. I provide a summary of stock options 
determinants and their expected associations to stock option grants in Appendix A. 
 Financial Reporting Concerns - As discussed above, the past accounting 
advantage of executive stock options led firms to use them instead of other forms of 
compensation to reduce reported compensation expense and to boost reported earnings. 
Previous literature as identified the need to access apital markets and the need to meet 
debt covenant as circumstances under which firms becam  particularly concerned about 
earnings reporting (Carter et al. [2007]). Based on this I use as proxy for costs of 
reporting low earnings the extent to which the firm has access to equity and debt 
markets (Access_Equity and Access_Debt). I expect firms with higher financial 
reporting concerns to have an excessively high use of executive stock options to boost 
earnings in the pre-SFAS 123R period. However, after SFAS 123R I expect financial 
reporting concerns to became a minor driver of executive stock options.  
Financial Constraints - Equity compensation requires no cash outlay, thus firms 
with lack of liquidity and cash constraints tend to use equity compensation to conserve 
cash, namely stock options, as instruments to motivate and retain employees (Core and 
Guay [1999]). Following Core and Guay (1999), I measure cash constraints 
(Cash_Cons) as common and preferred dividends minus cash flow from investing and 
operating activities, scaled by total assets. Also, prior studies argue that there are tax 
costs when firms use executive stock options, since the tax deduction are deferred until 
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options exercise (Bryan et al. [2006]). So, I expect that firms with higher net loss carry 
forwards (TLCF) are not likely to use stock options, in order to take immediate tax 
deduction from cash compensation. I expect these two variables to be relevant for stock 
options use in both periods but especially in the post-SFAS 123R period. 
Agency Costs and Tenure - The higher the CEO stock ownership the lower is the 
agency cost problem and therefore the lower is the ne d for additional shareholder-
manager alignment. Thus, firms with higher CEO stock wnership (CEO_Ownership) 
are expected to award fewer equity compensation grats (Choudhary et al. [2006]). 
Following Bryan et al. (2000) I include the firms’ ratio of debt to assets (Debt_Assets) 
in my equations to mitigate the agency cost of debt. I expect a negative relation between 
debt to assets and stock options grants, since highleveraged firms have natural 
incentives and so there is less need for incentive-based compensation. Risk-averse 
CEOs are expected to prefer cash compensation over equity compensation. The higher 
the length time the CEO is in the company less risk-averse he tends to be since he feels 
more stable and secure [Carter et al. (2007)]. To proxy CEO tenure I use the number of 
years of credited service under the firm pension plan (Service_Years) and CEO age 
(Age). I expect these four variables to be relevant both in the pre and post-SFAS 123R 
periods. 
Firm Performance - According to Murphy (1985) executive compensation s 
positively correlated with firm’s performance, thus I expect a positive relation between 
firm performance and stock options. For measure of the firm performance in the capital 
markets I use the year earnings per share diluted including extraordinary items (EPS) 
and one year return to shareholders (1YrReturn). Another reason for the use of these 
variables is that due to the formula of an option, a stock price variation causes a 
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correspondent reaction in the value of stock options that uses that stock as underlying 
asset. I expect both variables to be relevant both in the pre and post-SFAS 123R 
periods. 
Governance - Better governed firms are expected to use stock options for their 
justified real economic benefits and not driven by the accounting advantages of the pre-
expensing period that allowed mangers to use stock options to hide their excessive pay 
(Core et al. [2003]). As a governance measure I use the Bebchuk Entrenchment Index 
(E_Index), which is a governance measure that identifi s six provisions negatively 
correlated with firm valuation12. If the real reason to grant stock options by poorly 
governed firms is that options represent excess pay that does not depress earnings then, 
I expect bad governance to be positively associated with stock options grants in the pre-
expensing period but after SFAS 123R be introduced I expect this variable loses 
significance. 
Standard Economic Determinants - In larger firms it is difficult to monitor the 
actions of managers and so it is likely the use of mechanisms to align management and 
shareholders interests, therefore I expect larger firms to grant more stock options. To 
control for the firm size I use the total assets of the firm (T_Assets). When firms have 
higher growth opportunities the use of equity compensation is an important instrument 
to incentive managers towards the increase in firm value, similar to Carter et al. (2007) I 
use book to market ratio (BMratio) as a proxy for growth opportunities, the higher the 
BMratio the lower are the firms’ growth opportunities. Thus, I expect a negative 
relation between this variable and stock options. Following Gerakos et al. (2005) I use 
the level of investment relative to competitors in the same industry (Rel_Investment) to 
                                                           
12 The six entrenchment provisions are Staggered Board, Limitation on Amending Bylaws, Limitation on Amending the Charter, 
Supermajority to Approve a Merger, Golden Parachute and Poison Pill. 
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establish if the use of stock options is higher when firms have investment levels lower 
than competitors or if firms decrease the use of stck options when firms’ investment 
levels are higher than competitors’ levels. So, I expect a negative relation between stock 
options and this variable. 
4.2. Research Design 
I test hypothesis 1 by estimating two different models, a Pooled Model and a Pre 
vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model. Using the Pooled Model, that comprises values from 2000 
to 2006, I am able to assess the factors that where determining executive stock options 
grants in the entire sample period and introduce int raction effects to test the changes 
that occurred after SFAS 123R be introduced. As thidata includes the noise of the 
accelerating vesting and anticipation period that occurred in 2003 and in 2004, I also 
estimate the Pooled Model without these two transaction years, and in fact I find 
differences. Additionally, in order to capture the true effect of the new rule, I apply the 
Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model, which makes it possible to compare clearly the 
different executive stock options determinants betwe n the pre and post-SFAS 123R 
periods without the two transaction years (2003 and 2004). 
Pooled Model - Equation 1 shows the regression I estimate with the pooled data, 
via OLS13:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
13 I estimate equation 1for the total sample years and for the sample years without 2003 and 2004. 
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Where DV Post is an indicator variable coded as one wh n the observation is 
from after June 2005 (the date SFAS 123R became effective), and zero otherwise. All 
other variables are as calculated and discussed in Appendix A. To control for industry 
effects I construct 24 industry dummies (as there are 24 different industries in the 
sample) and include 23 of them in equation 1. Each of t ese indicator variables is coded 
as one when the observation is from that industry and zero otherwise. Using this model 
I am able to assess the factors that where determining executive stock options grants in 
the period before SFAS 123R (via the estimate coeffici nts for β1 to β14) and to evaluate 
the change of importance of these variables (via the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms) that came to be after the introduction of SFAS 123R.   
Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model - Equation 2 shows the regression I estimate for 
the pre and post-SFAS 123R periods, via OLS:  
 
 
 
 
As in equation 1, I include 23 industry dummies to control for industry effects in 
this equation. Through this model I compute and compare two OLS regressions. The 
first OLS regression describes the situation before SFAS 123R and assumes the 
transaction effects of SFAS 123R occurred in 2003 and in 2004, using only data from 
2000 to 2002 for the pre-rule period. The second OLS regression comprehends the 
period post-SFAS 123R and for this I use the average values between 2005 and 2006. 
These two OLS regressions make it possible to separately analyze the different 
executive stock options determinants. This research design is similar to the one of 
Carter et al. (2007); however my model allows to ascertain the changes in CEO 
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compensation drivers after SFAS 123R effective and mandatory date of implementation 
for all companies and also to investigate how stock ptions drivers (both types - real 
economic drivers of stock options and the determinants associated to the past 
accounting advantages) changes are determining decisions on stock options grants after 
SFAS 123R effective date of implementation. 
4.3. Results 
Pooled Model - Table 3 presents the results for the pooled OLS regressions with 
total sample years for stock options (first column), restricted stock (second column) and 
total compensation (third column). Equation 1 is estimated with these three dependent 
variables (stock options, restricted stock and total compensation)14. All the pooled OLS 
regressions are estimated using robust clustered erors (by firms) and eliminate outliers 
using the values of Rstudent15.  
The variables that are significant for stock options use and present expected 
signs in the period before SFAS 123R introduction are: Access_Debt that is positively 
and statistically significant revealing that when accessing debt markets firms tended to 
use stock options to reduce compensation expense and boost reported earnings; firm 
leverage (Debt_Assets) is significantly and negatively associated to stock options 
grants, suggesting lower stock options grants from high leveraged firms; 
CEO_Ownership, which is negatively and statistically ssociated with the use of stock 
options, showing a lower need for additional shareholder-manager alignment when the 
CEO has a high number of shares outstanding; EPS that is significant and positively 
associated to stock options, revealing a positive relation between firm performance and 
                                                           
14 In Table 3 for each OLS pooled regression (stock options, restricted stock and total compensation) here are displayed the 
predicted signs of the coefficients from equation 1 with each of the three dependent variables. 
15 For the Rstudent outliers correction I used as elimination criteria the absolute value of 2. 
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stock options;  Ln T_Assets also positively related o stock options confirming that 
larger firms grant higher levels of stock options and finally BMratio that has a 
significant negative impact on stock options, indicating that firms with larger growth 
opportunities tend to increase the use of stock options.  
However in the pre-SFAS 123R period, two of the estimated coefficients have 
signs statistically different from the predictions, 1YrReturn and Age. 1YrReturn has a 
significantly negative impact on the use of stock options, a possible explanation for this 
outcome is that poor past performances lead firms to increase the intensity of incentive 
based compensation using stock options to pursue a pay for performance goal. 
Concerning the introduction of the new rule, as predict d in hypothesis 1, it has 
significant impacts on the relevance and effects of stock options determinants: 
Access_Debt became negatively related to stock options, indicating that financial 
reporting concerns of firms accessing debt markets lose relevance determining the use 
of stock options. Still regarding financial reporting concerns, after SFAS 123R be 
introduced Access_Equity contributes positively to st ck options grants, result that 
probably has to do with the increase in transparency a d quality of financial reporting 
after the mandatory expensing. For firms accessing equity markets makes sense to use 
stock options as incentive tool to increase firm equity value and by avoiding options cut 
backs firms signal that in past they were not granting stock options to benefit from 
accounting advantages. Financial constraints (Cash_Cons) turn to be statistically 
positive to determine the use of stock options, indicating that when firms have cash 
constraints use stock options in order to attract and maintained CEOs, as expected since 
cash constraints are a justified real economic benefit of stock options. CEO_Ownership 
became statistically positive, result that reports a higher use of stock options for CEOs 
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with larger amounts of shares outstanding upon mandatory expensing. Finally 
concerning the economic determinants of stock options (Ln T_Assets, BMratio and 
Rel_Investment) all reinforce significance after the rule introduction. 
Regarding the results from the Pooled Model without SFAS 123R transaction 
years (2003 e 2004), they bear small differences, the main one concerns the variable 
1YrReturn, in this model 1YrReturn only becomes negatively related with stock options 
after the rule becomes effective, result suggesting that the negative sign of 1YrReturn in 
the pooled model using the total sample years is due to the inclusion of 2003 and 2004. 
Thus, upon imminent mandatory expensing in 2003 and 2004 firms’ usage of stock 
options became dependent from past poor performance in order to incentive and 
motivate CEOs to improve earnings. This way SFAS 123R contributed to the use of real 
economic benefit of options, namely the creation of incentives to increase firm value.  
In order to visibly capture the true SFAS 123R impacts excluding transaction 
effects from 2003 and 2004 I next show the Pre vs. Po t-SFAS 123R Model’ results16.  
Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R - Table 4 exhibits the OLS regressions for the Pre vs. 
Post-SFAS 123R Model. Equation 2 is estimated with three different dependent 
variables. The first concerns stock options, the second is for restricted stock and the 
final one relates to CEO total compensation. For each one of the dependent variables 
two OLS regressions are estimated: one before SFAS 123R and another afterwards. All 
Pre and Post-SFAS 123R regressions include industry dummies as controls, are 
estimated using robust corrections and eliminate ouliers by analyzing Rstudent17. 
Through this model one can clearly see the pre and post-SFAS 123R statistically 
significant variables for determine stock options ue. Consistent with earlier 
                                                           
16 In Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model the pre period counts only with 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
17 For the Rstudent outliers correction I used as elimination criteria the absolute value of 2. 
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expectations and with the Pooled Model, financial reporting concerns associated to debt 
markets (Access_Debt) are positively associated to stock options grants in the pre-
expensing period, showing that in order to guarantee a better access to debt markets the 
use of stock options to boost reported earnings was likely to happen. After SFAS 123R 
this variable is statistically negative, showing that firms no longer use options to 
improve earnings in order to reduce financial reporting costs and to meet debt 
covenants. Access_Equity as in the Pooled Model has a significant positive impact on 
stock options after the rule implementation, suggesting that firms facing options 
expensing when access equity markets use stock options as incentive tool to increase 
firm equity value even without accounting benefits, which thus not happen when firms 
access debt markets. Cash constraints are positively associated to stock options use, but 
only in the post-SFAS 123R. This indicates that firms, without options accounting 
benefits, started to use options in order to conserve cash allowing the preservation of 
CEOs motivation. Results indicate that CEO_Ownership has a negative impact on the 
use of stock option before the rule supporting thatCEOs with high number of shares 
outstanding do not need intensive compensation incentives. Conversely after SFAS 
123R be introduced, CEO_Ownership contributes positively to stock options use. Firm 
leverage (Debt_Assets), as predicted, has a negativ impact in stock options usage in 
both periods indicating that leveraged firms are less likely to use stock options, but this 
factor loses significance after the rule. As for CEO tenure, in the pre-expensing period 
Service_Years and Age are positively related to stock ptions grants but only 
Service_Years is significant, these coefficients are ccording to the predictions since 
stock options are suitable for less risk-averse executives. After the new rule be 
introduced both variables are significant however the coefficients signs become 
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negatively related with stock options grants, so after SFAS 123R less risk-averse CEOs 
are likely to receive lower stock options grants.  
Regarding firm performance, as predicted, EPS and 1YrReturn are both 
positively related to stock options in the pre-SFAS 123R period. Nonetheless, only one 
year return to shareholders (1YrReturn) is significant. After the rule be introduced 
1YrReturn as a negative coefficient, and as in the Pooled Model this is evidence for the 
use of stock options as a way to  increase the intensity of incentive-based compensation 
upon poor past performance. 
Before and after the rule, firm size (Ln_T_Assets) is positively associated with 
stock options, so as expected larger firms are the ones granting higher levels of stock 
options, due to the superior need to align shareholders and mangers interests. As regards 
book to market ratio (BMratio) it is negatively related to stock options grants, 
independently from mandatory option expensing, however the coefficient impact is 
higher in the after rule period, telling that the use of stock options as incentive tool to 
increase firm value when firms have higher growth opportunities is predominant after 
the implementation of SFAS 123R, which is expected since in the post-rule scenario 
firms have reasons to use stock options for their real economic benefits. 
To conclude on the impact of SFAS 123R on stock options determinants: the 
relevance of financial reporting concerns bears huge alterations after SFAS 123R, 
indicating that firms used stock options motivated by accounting benefits; financial 
constraints gain significance after the rule introduction; the impact of agency cost, 
tenure and firm performance on stock options suffer dramatic changes after SFAS 
123R; firm governance (E_Index) is not explaining the use of stock options either 
before or after the rule; and firm size and book to market ratio are the most relevant 
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economic determinants of options. Overall, the findings reveal that stock options drivers 
have changed after SFAS 123R, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. 
5.  Performance Equity Grants 
5.1. Hypothesis Development and Variable Definitions 
As referred to in the literature review, criticism that traditional equity grants 
provide inadequate incentives to improve shareholders wealth is huge and several 
studies have proved that on theory performance options are better in incentives 
(Johnson and Tian [2000], Arya and Mittendorf [2005] and Bettis et al. [2008]). Thus, 
without accounting barriers to this type of grants I expect an increase in performance 
equity grants after SFAS 123R. To capture the effect of performance equity grants I use 
two indicator variables, DV_Opt_Perf (DV_RS_Perf), which are coded as one when the 
firm issued an option performance grant (restricted stock performance grant) in that year 
and zero otherwise.  
H2: The use of performance equity grants has an impact on the decrease of the 
traditional stock options use. 
5.2. Research Design 
In order to test hypothesis 2, I employ an OLS change model between 2006 and 
2003, where I am able to investigate if the change i  option grants value during this 
period (which is negative) is correlated to the increase in the use of performance equity 
grants. Equation 3 shows the regression I estimate vi  OLS: 
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In the OLS change model for performance equity grants I use the difference 
from 2006 to 2003, since 2006 is the year after SFA 123R for all companies and 2003 
because it is the older available year with performance data. To control for industry 
effects I include 23 industry dummies in the regressions. The regression also includes 
Robust and Rstudent corrections18. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
5.3. Results 
 Table 5 exhibits the results of the estimation of equation 3. The main objective is 
to investigate whether the change in option grants value during this period (which is 
negative) is correlated to an increase in the use of performance equity grants, namely 
performance stock options and performance restricted s ock. The estimated coefficient 
for DV_Opt_Perf is significantly positive. This revals that the decrease in stock 
options is associated with an increase in option performance grants, which supports 
hypothesis 2. Thus, the introduction of SFAS 123R has led to the removal of accounting 
barriers from performance-based equity compensation that are considered to be better 
aligning incentives, in management retention and gauging managerial talent. 
6. Complementary Analysis 
In order to assess how the determinants of stock options are also driving the 
decisions on restricted stock and CEO total compensation both before and after the rule, 
I apply equation 1 and equation 2 to restricted stock and to CEO total compensation. 
The equations for the Pooled Model and for the Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model for 
restricted stock and total compensation are in Appendix B.  
 
 
                                                           
18 For the Rstudent outliers correction I used as elimination criteria the absolute value of 2. 
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6.1. SFAS 123R Impacts on CEO Total Compensation  
Based on the results of Murphy (2002), “(…) the increase in CEO pay in 
S&P500 industrials over the 1990’s primarily reflects a dramatic growth in stock 
options (…)”, stock options are allegedly the cause for the overcompensation problem 
in U.S., thus I hypothesize that stock options determinants explain CEO total 
compensation levels in the pre-SFAS 123R period. However, after SFAS 123R 
introduction, I expect total compensation drivers to become less similar from stock 
options ones.  
 Table 3 exhibits the results for the estimation of the total compensation pooled 
model. In this model one can see that before the rule is introduced several independent 
variables have similar impacts on total compensation and stock options, to be precise 
firm leverage (Debt_Assets), CEO_Ownership, EPS, Ln T_Assets and BMratio. The 
rule introduction causes only a common significant change on stock options and total 
compensation, which is the turn in the coefficient sign of CEO_Ownership that becomes 
positive, indicating that after SFAS 123R a CEO posses ing a large number of shares 
outstanding is likely to receive higher stock options grants and overall compensation 
levels. After the rule introduction 1YrReturn gains positive significance explaining total 
compensation levels, whereas as it was seen in the pool d model for stock options the 
rule introduction has a negative effect in the relation between 1YrReturn and stock 
options use. This difference means that upon option expensing the use of total 
compensation continues to be positively related to firm performance while the use of 
stock options is dependent from poor past performance.  
Through the pooled model is also possible to see that total compensation drivers 
where much closer to stock options determinants than o restricted stock ones before 
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SFAS 123R introduction, for instance firm leverage (Debt_Assets) and BMratio are 
both positively related to restricted stock contrary to what happens with stock options 
and total compensation, and EPS is not significant to explain the use of restricted stock 
as it is in the case of total compensation and stock options.  
The results for the Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model, in Table 4, reveal quite a few 
similarities between total compensation drivers andstock options ones and as it was 
expected these resemblances are predominant in the pre-SFAS 123R period. Agency 
costs (Debt_Assets and CEO_Ownership), firm performance (1YrReturn) and economic 
determinants (Ln T_Assets and BMratio) all have thesame sign impacts and are 
significant to explain stock options and CEO total compensation levels before SFAS 
123R be introduced. Comparing the determinants of st ck options and total 
compensation, none of them present significant differences in coefficient signs, fact that 
reveals a great level of similarity between the variables that were explaining total 
compensation and stock options before options expensing.  
After the rule effective implementation, stock optins and total compensation 
determinants became different from each other. In the presence of mandatory options 
expensing only economic determinants (Ln T_Assets and BMratio) maintain the 
previous same sign and significance impacts with both stock options and total 
compensation. CEO tenure (Service_Years) and financal reporting concerns associated 
to equity markets (Access_Equity) turn to have equal effects on stock options and total 
compensation. Concerning agency costs, firm leverage (Debt_Assets) and 
CEO_Ownership lose significance explaining total compensation levels, one possible 
justification for this outcome is that after SFAS 123R total compensation is not mainly 
made of stock options, so it is likely that total compensation drivers that were similar to 
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the ones of stock option before the rule become diff rent in the post-expensing period. 
Upon option expensing CEO total compensation and stock options drivers present few 
significant differences especially concerning financi l constraints (Cash_Cons), which 
makes sense since after SFAS 123R firms facing cashonstraints no longer do an 
abusive use of stock options to increase compensation levels and so firms with lack of 
liquidity tend to decrease overall compensation levels, and also involving firm 
performance (1YrReturn) evident and explained earlir from the comparison of  the 
pooled models for total compensation and stock options.    
Consistent with my expectations, in what concerns the impact of stock options 
drivers on CEO total compensation, most of them have the same sign correlations and 
significances with total compensation than they have with stock options, but they tend 
to become different after SFAS 123R, period when total compensation is no longer 
mainly made of stock options.  
6.2. SFAS 123R Impacts on Restricted Stock 
According to past authors restricted stock has been rarely used and stock options 
have been used in excess, thus core drivers for stock options are unlikely to explain the 
use of restricted stock (Carter et al. [2007] and Brown and Lee [2007]), as so I expect 
that stock options and restricted stock grants determinants to be different. 
 Results from estimation of the pooled restricted stock model (in Table 3) are 
quite different; confirming that drivers for restricted stock are different from stock 
options ones, supporting my expectations. Before the rule impact, from the variables 
that are significant for restricted stock only firm size (Ln T_Assets), CEO_Ownership 
and CEO Age present equal significant estimation sig s with stock options. At the same 
time Service_Years (the other proxy for CEO tenure) has a different impact on these 
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two types of equity-based compensation, leaving the equal effect of CEO Age between 
the two compromised19. The impact of SFAS 123R introduction on restricted stock 
reveals a significant negative relation between bad governance (E_Index) and restricted 
stock use, while the governance measure even though presents the expected sign is not 
significant explaining stock options use either in pre or in post-period. Another 
significant difference after the rule is the negative impact of  Rel_Investment on 
restricted stock and its positive effect on stock options, this means that when firms have 
investment levels superior to their competitors their use of restricted stock decreases 
while they continue to grant stock options. Subsequent to SFAS 123R, financial 
constraints (Ln TLCF and Cash_Cons) have equal coeffi ient signs correlations with 
restricted stock and stock options which is an important change since without 
accounting barriers firms facing financial constrains begins to use restricted stock as an 
alternative to stock options, but still the positive impact of SFAS 123R in Cash_Cons is 
not sufficient to change the significance of this variable. 
Referring now to Table 4, in the Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model for restricted 
stock, it is possible to see that stock options determinants are different from restricted 
stock ones, however after the rule be introduced there are a number of changes in 
restricted stock determinants and some resemblances between the factors explaining 
stock options and restricted stock come out. Before the rule come to be effective 
CEO_Ownership and firm size (Ln T_Assets) were the only variables equally affecting 
restricted stock and stock options. Despite the same pre-SFAS 123R impact of 
CEO_Ownership, after the rule this variable continues to be negatively related to 
                                                           
19 The negative coefficient of Service_Years with restricted stock is within the spirit of Lambert and Larcker (2004), that points 
restricted stock has a better choice for risk-averse mployees.  Higher Service_Years corresponds to the case of senior CEOs that 
tend to be less risk averse, explaining the negative relation between Service_Years and restricted stock. 
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restricted stock while it turns to be positively relat d with both stock options and total 
compensation levels. Another significant difference between restricted stock 
explanatory factors and the ones from stock options a d total compensation is the 
positive relation between restricted stock use and firm leverage (Debt_Assets) that even 
increases significance after the rule implementation. In the pre-SFAS 123R period CEO 
tenure (Age and Service_Years) signs impact on restricted stock were significantly 
different from what happens with stock options, however after the effective 
implementation of the rule CEO tenure as equal significa t effects on restricted stock 
and stock options. Regardless of the visible differences in most of restricted stock 
independent variables, upon options expensing several factors explaining restricted 
stock bear important alterations and turn out to have the same coefficient signs as they 
have with stock options. Namely, financial constrains (Cash_Cons and Ln TLCF), firm 
performance (1YrReturn) and BMratio, although from these factors only Ln TLCF 
became significant immediately after the rule implementation. 
Overall results reveal that restricted stock determinants are quite different from 
stock option ones, supporting my expectations. An interesting result is that even after 
the rule (when stock options no longer benefit from accounting advantages) the drivers 
for these two types of equity compensation remain sig ificantly different, even though 
there is a visible approximation in coefficient signs. 
7.  Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the change in factors associated 
with firms’ decisions to grant stock options after the introduction of SFAS 123R. One of 
the factors considered is the existence of performance conditions in new grants. 
Concurrently, this study examines if these factors are also driving the decisions on 
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restricted stock grants and on CEO total compensation. In my study I use a sample of 
385 firms from the S&P 500 from 2000 to 2006 and compensation data for the firms’ 
CEOs. 
Consistent with past literature (Brown and Lee [2007] and Carter et al. [2007]) I 
find statistically evidence for the decrease in stock ptions use and for the increase in 
restricted stock grants associated to SFAS 123R. I have also find that stock options 
grants still bear a huge decrease after SFAS 123R effective date of implementation for 
all companies, so after December 2005. 
Empirical findings proved significance of hypothesis 1, that assumes a change in 
stock options drivers after SFAS 123R. Results from the Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R 
Model, that excludes the anticipation and accelerating vesting effects (2003 and 2004), 
show that financial reporting concerns associated to ebt markets were determining the 
use of stock options in the pre-SFAS 123R period but after SFAS 123R this factor as a 
negative significance explaining stock options. This result proves that pre-SFAS 123R 
factors behind the choice of stock options were associated to the previous accounting 
advantages but after mandatory expensing the impact of these factors change. Also as a 
result from this model I find that financial constraints (Cash_Cons), agency costs 
(Debt_Assets and CEO_Ownership), firm performance (1YrReturn) and economic 
determinants (firm size and BMratio) are important to determine stock options either 
before and after the rule, establishing that these are the justified real economic drivers 
for stock options use. In line with nowadays critics of traditional stock options that 
suggest an increase in the use of performance-based equity compensation, the third 
model, the Change Model for Performance Grants, finds evidence consistent with 
hypothesis 2, confirming that the increase in option performance grants had a significant 
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impact in the decrease of traditional stock options. From this result I can conclude that 
SFAS 123R has the potential to alter the effective design of CEO compensation that 
finally demands a lot more thought than simply awarding “plain-vanilla” options and 
means the removal of accounting barriers from more efficient equity-based 
compensation as it is the case of performance equity grants. As for complementary 
analysis, I find evidence, in the Pooled and in Prevs. Post-SFAS 123R Models, that 
stock options drivers are quite different from resticted stock ones, both in the pre and 
post-SFAS 123R periods. In pre-SFAS 123R period restricted stock was being rarely 
used due to the favorable accounting treatment of stock options, thus stock options 
drivers were expected to be completely different from the ones explaining restricted 
stock use. However, after SFAS 123R, stock options do not benefit from accounting 
advantages and still the determinates for these two types of equity compensation 
remains different, even though there is a visible approximation tendency. This leave for 
future research the discover of the true restricted stock drivers. In what concerns the 
impact of SFAS 123R on CEO total compensation, consistent with Carter et al. (2007) I 
find no evidence of an impact of SFAS 123R in the leve  of CEO total compensation, 
just in the composition of this variable. I also find that total compensation drivers were 
similar to stock options ones, however SFAS 123R introduction differentiates CEO total 
compensation determinants from the variables that are explaining stock options use 
upon mandatory expensing. Future research could collect a broader set of data, 
gathering more than 2 years of observations after the ule. This way it would be possible 
to analyze the medium run impacts of SFAS 123R on the choice between stock options 
and restricted stock and on CEO total compensation levels.  
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Appendix A – Hypothesis Development and Variables Dfinitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* TDC1 calculated under the 1992 reporting format comprises the following: Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes), Total 
Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. Used in the sample for 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 e 2005. 
TDC1 calculated under the 2006 reporting format comprises the following: Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards, Salary, Bonus, Grant-Date Fair 
Value of Stock Awards, Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Deferred Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation, and Other 
Compensation. Used in the sample for 2006. 
This Table contains the variable descriptions and the expected associations of the dependent and indepe nt variables used in the research models. The 
sign predictions and the hypothesized associations are referent to stock options grants, although the Table presents also the description of RS and 
T_Compensation, since these variables are used in the research models for restricted stock and for total compensation.  
(i) Where: cstk – common stock, caps – capital surplus, pstk – preferred stock, tstk – treasury stock, at – total assets 
(ii) Where: dlc – debt current liabilities, dltt – debt long term liabilities, at – total assets 
(iii) Where: dvc – common dividend, dvp – preferred dividend, ivncf – cash flow from investment activities, oancf – cash flow from 
operating activities, at – total assets 
(iv) Where: dlc – debt current liabilities, dltt – debt long term liabilities, at – total assets 
(v) Where: seq – shareholders equity, pstk – preferr d stock, csho – common shares outstanding, prccf – final price fiscal year 
(vi) Where: capx – capital expenditures, xrd – R&D expense, xad – advertising expense, at – total assets 
Access_Equity
Financial Reporting 
Concerns
+ No Access to Equity Markets
Compustat Variables [(year increase in cstk+ caps+pstk-
tstk)/at] (i)
Access_Debt
Financial Reporting 
Concerns
+ No Access to Debt Markets Compustat Variables [(year increase in dlc+dltt)/at] (ii)
Cash_Cons Financial Constrains + Yes Cash Constrains Compustat Variables [(dvc+dvp-ivncf -oancf)/at] (iii)
TLCF Financial Constrains - Yes Net Operating Loss carry-fowards Compustat Variable tlcf
Age Tenure + Yes CEO Age Execucomp Variable AGE
Service_Years Tenure + Yes
Number of years of credited service under the firm 
pension plan
Execucomp Variable RET_YRS
Debt_Assets Agency Costs - No Debt to Assets Ratio Compustat Variables [(dlc+dltt)/at] (iv)
CEO_Ownership Agency Costs - Yes
Percentage of total shares outstanding held by the 
executive
Execucomp Variable SHROWN_TOT_PCT
EPS Firm Performance + Yes
Earnings per share diluted including extraordinary 
items
Compustat Variable epsfi
1YrReturn Firm Performance + Yes
1 year total return to shareholders with reinvestement 
of dividends
Execucomp Variable TRS1YR
E_Index Governance + ? Governance  measure Bebchuck Entreachment Index
DV_Opt_Perf Performance Grants - Yes
Dummy variable set equal to one if the firm has grant  
any performance option and zero otherwise
Collected information from Statement of Changes of 
Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form4)
DV_RS_Perf Performance Grants - Yes
Dummy variable set equal to one if the firm has grant 
any performance restricted stock and zero otherwise
Collected information from Statement of Changes of 
Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form4)
T_Assets Firm Size Control + Yes Total Assets Compustat Variable at
BMratio Growth Opportunities - Yes Book to market ratio Compustat Variables [(seq-pstk)/(csho x prccf)] (v)
Rel_Investment Investment Level - Yes Investment level relative to industry competitors
Compustat Variables [(capx + xrd + xad )/at] - industry 
median (vi)
Options Dependent Variable . .  Option Grants
Execucomp Variable OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE 
until 2006 and in 2006 Execucomp Variable 
OPTION_AWARD_FV
RS Dependent Variable . .  Restricted Stock Grants Execucomp Variable RSTKGRNT
T_Compensation Dependent Variable . . Total Compensation Execucomp Variable TDC1*
Variables
Determinants of 
Stock Options
Data SourceVariable Description
Expected Sign 
Pre SFAS 
123R
Importance 
After SFAS 
123R
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Appendix B – Models for Restricted Stock and Total Compensation 20 
Restricted Stock  
Pooled Model 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model 
 
 
 
 
Total Compensation 
Pooled Model 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Model 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 All the variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
21 Where DV Post is a dummy variable set equal to one if the observation is from after June 2005, the eff ctive date of SFAS 123R, and zero 
otherwise. The Pooled Model is estimated with the total sample years and without SFAS 123R transaction years (2003 and 2004). 
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Table 1 – Sample Selection and Industry Classificaton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The changes in Panel B are 
between the period after SFAS 
123R (mean of 2005 and 2006) 
and the period before the rule 
and transaction period (mean of 
2000, 2001 and 2002). Thus 
negative changes indicate 
decreases in the variables. 
The Execucomp report format 
for the variable used for total 
compensation (TDC1) has 
changed in 2006 and in the new 
format the value of restricted 
stock grants appears included in 
the stock awards fair value. 
Thus, the segregated value of 
restricted stock grants in 2006 is 
missing and in the post-SFAS 
123R period the variable 
restricted stock comprehends 
only values for 2005. 
 
Observations from ExecuComp data basis for 2000 until 2006 3,189
Less: observations missing necessary Compustat data 221
Less: observations missing necessary Corporate Governance data 273
Final number of observations 2,695
Final sample of firms in each year 385
Panel A - Sample Selection
SPINDEX Industry description Number of firms 
% of firms in 
each industry
Mean industry 
% change in 
Options 
Mean industry 
% change in RS
Mean industry 
% change in 
Total 
Compensation
Mean industry 
% change in 
Options/Total 
Compensation
Mean industry 
% change in 
RS/Total 
Compensation
1010 Energy 196 7.3% -12.1% 135.2% 49.2% -41.1% 5.7%
1510 Materials 168 6.2% -26.5% 230.1% 20.9% -17.2% 12.1%
2010 Capital Goods 224 8.3% -20.9% -42.2% 10.1% -11.4% -9.9%
2020 Commercial  & Professional Services 56 2.1% -35.3% -3.6% 14.1% -15.8% -4.0%
2030 Transportation 63 2.3% -8.0% 11.6% 65.3% -18.1% -6.4%
2510 Automobiles & Components 14 0.5% -7.2% -100.0% 117.4% -24.0% -8.7%
2520 Consumer Durables & Apparel 140 5.2% -26.5% 275.8% 31.5% -22.1% 16.9%
2530 Consumer Services 70 2.6% -54.8% 243.9% 30.4% -40.7% 6.5%
2540 Media 77 2.9% -74.6% 440.8% -35.3% -32.8% 17.8%
2550 Retailing 140 5.2% -25.1% 94.5% 32.0% -20.9% 5.2%
3010 Food & Staples Retailing 49 1.8% -30.3% 434.5% 23.6% -19.9% 27.4%
3020 Food, Beverage & Tobacco 140 5.2% -46.1% -6.9% -8.7% -18.7% 0.3%
3030 Household & Personal Products 35 1.3% -56.4% 59.1% -23.2% -17.5% 18.5%
3510 Health Care Equipment & Services 154 5.7% -24.1% 28.8% 10.1% -18.1% 1.7%
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 147 5.5% -40.3% 45.0% -11.3% -19.4% 3.9%
4010 Banks 133 4.9% -9.7% 193.2% 49.0% -20.3% 6.5%
4020 Diversified Financials 119 4.4% -17.4% 226.0% 23.2% -14.8% 20.5%
4030 Insurance 119 4.4% -39.0% 377.4% 15.8% -21.2% 12.8%
4040 Real Estate 21 0.8% -20.6% -5.0% 8.2% -9.2% -3.2%
4510 Software & Services 140 5.2% -23.0% 31.1% -15.5% -6.2% 3.4%
4520 Technology Hardware & Equipment 140 5.2% -83.0% 221.6% -71.5% -25.0% 16.4%
4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 105 3.9% -44.5% 5642.5% -18.8% -22.0% 21.2%
5010 Telecommunication Services 35 1.3% -83.5% 1101.7% -33.3% -36.9% 31.5%
5510 Utilities 210 7.8% -30.8% 11.8% 17.8% -13.3% -0.6%
2695 100% -35% 402% 13% -21% 8%Total
Panel B - Industry Classification
 
The variables in the pie charts correspond to the 
components of total compensation according to the 
definition of the Execucomp variable TDC1. From 2006 
on, the Execucomp report format changes and therefor  
the components of TDC1 bear small alterations as it can 
be seen in 2006 pie chart. Have in mind that the totals 
from this new report format are not completely 
comparable to the previews report format, but they ar  the 
only available. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics                  Panel B – Evolution of CEO Total Compensation 
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11%
67%
7%
7%
8%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2000
bonus
SO BLS
RS
salary
other
11%
66%
8%
7%
7%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2001
bonus
SO BLS
RS
salary
other
14%
56%
11%
10%
9%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2002
bonus
SO BLS
RS
salary
other
20%
44%
17%
10%
10%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2004
bonus
SO BLS
RS
salary
other
21%
38%
18%
10%
13%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2005
bonus
SO BLS
RS
salary
other
5%
16%
52%
6%
21%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2006
bonus
option awards Fv
stock awards fv
salary
other
20%
40%
18%
11%
11%
Distribution of Total Compensation in 2003
Bonus
ESO BLS
RS
Salary
Other
In the particular case of restricted stock the post period only comprises values 
for 2005, since in the 2006 Execucomp report format res ricted stock values are 
included inside stock grants fair value and as so the segregated values for 
restricted stock are missing. 
These descriptive statistics comprises the values from 2000 until 2006. 
All the variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variables
Pre SFAS 123R (2000-2002)
Mean
Post SFAS 123R (2005-2006)
Mean
Two Sample Mean 
Comparison t test
CEO Stock Options Grants            
($ thousands)
7,027 3,344 t =  -4.534
CEO Restricted Stock Grants 
($ thousands)
938 1,885 t =   3.941
CEO Total Compensation 
($ thousands)
11,052 13,655 t =   0.844
CEO Stock Options Grants  as 
% of Total Compensation
53.7% 28.6% t = -15.632
CEO Restricted Stock Grants  
as % of Total Compensation
7.9% 15.4% t =   5.706
Panel A - Mean of CEO compensation in Pre and Post SFAS 123R
Variables Mean Median SD
Options ($thousands) 5,080.947 2,479.843 15,372.330
RS ($thousands) 1,153.486 0.000 3,647.496
T_Compensation ($thousands) 11,274.820 6,875.276 46,455.160
Access_Equity 0.042 0.003 0.317
Access_Debt 0.038 0.000 0.103
Cash_Cons -0.020 -0.019 0.091
TLCF ($thousands) 249,110.800 0.000 984,380.300
Age 56.000 56.000 6.000
Service_Years 10.369 0.000 13.802
Debt_Assets 0.242 0.229 0.171
CEO_Ownership 0.008 0.000 0.029
EPS 1.959 1.790 2.931
1YrReturn 0.162 0.119 0.429
E_Index 2.584 3.000 1.183
DV_Opt_Perf 0.017 0.000 0.130
DV_RS_Perf 0.031 0.000 0.174
T_Assets ($thousands) 35,800,000.000 9,402,160.000 109,000,000.000
BMratio 0.398 0.353 0.278
Rel_Investment 0.008 0.000 0.054
Panel C - Descriptive Statistics on the variables of the models
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Panel D – Correlation Matrix for the Stock Options Models’ Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These correlations comprise data for 2000 until 2006 and correspond to the Spearman correlation coeffiients (lower triangle) and Pearson correlation coeffici nts (upper triangle). The bold text indicates 
significance at the 0.05 levels or better. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Options Access_ Equity Access_ Debt Cash_ Cons TLCF Age Service_Years Debt_ Assets CEO_ Ownership EPS 1YrReturn E_Index T_Assets BMratio Rel_Investment
Options 1 0.0890 0.0570 0.0328 0.0263 -0.0234 -0.0494 -0.0802 0.0063 -0.0398 -0.0347 -0.0937 0.0225 -0.0556 0.0155
Access_Equity 0.0026 1 0.4598 0.0108 0.0076 -0.0433 -0.0496 -0.0204 0.0009 -0.0409 0.0689 -0.0015 -0.0267 -0.0557 0.0347
Access_Debt 0.0219 0.0281 1 0.0759 -0.0275 -0.0121 -0.0022 0.0861 -0.0084 0.0603 0.0453 0.0230 0.0159 -0.0416 0.0511
Cash_Cons 0.0086 0.1474 0.1711 1 -0.0089 0.0327 0.0612 0.2471 -0.0059 0.0060 -0.0204 0.0557 0.1314 0.1617 -0.0036
TLCF 0.0565 0.0165 -0.0210 -0.0718 1 -0.0362 -0.0387 0.0329 -0.0181 -0.1006 -0.0204 -0.0782 0.0302 0.0265 0.0034
Age -0.0435 0.0051 -0.0023 0.0343 -0.0664 1 0.1400 0.0236 0.1594 0.0030 -0.0099 -0.0447 0.0442 0.0509 0.0030
Service_Years 0.0264 -0.0998 0.0129 0.0442 -0.1008 0.1115 1 0.1506 -0.1161 0.0793 -0.0476 0.0411 0.0175 0.0713 0.0130
Debt_Assets -0.1113 -0.0402 0.1063 0.2306 -0.0152 0.0156 0.2218 1 -0.1312 0.0135 0.0117 0.0671 0.1577 0.0592 -0.0682
CEO_Ownership 0.0114 0.0947 0.0165 -0.0430 0.0067 0.1868 -0.1810 -0.1697 1 -0.0462 0.0154 -0.1350 -0.0500 -0.0542 0.0597
EPS -0.0319 -0.1530 0.1676 0.0612 -0.1092 0.0460 0.1341 0.0642 -0.0737 1 0.1645 0.0676 0.1677 -0.0175 -0.0220
1YrReturn -0.0978 0.0539 0.0302 -0.0611 -0.0198 -0.0113 -0.0472 -0.0164 0.0624 0.2007 1 0.0422 -0.0276 -0.1912 -0.0226
E_Index -0.0872 -0.0067 0.0466 0.0511 -0.0353 -0.0402 0.0696 0.1084 -0.0995 0.1023 0.0566 1 -0.1092 0.1144 -0.0281
T_Assets 0.1635 -0.1513 0.0927 0.2625 -0.0406 0.0659 0.2087 0.2003 -0.2631 0.2775 -0.0576 -0.0629 1 0.1151 -0.0438
BMratio -0.1536 0.0111 0.0024 0.2532 -0.0141 0.0628 0.0719 0.1484 -0.0586 0.0743 -0.1670 0.1555 0.3552 1 -0.1921
Rel_Investment 0.0445 0.0448 0.0299 0.0190 -0.0150 0.0261 0.0626 -0.0524 0.0106 0.0218 -0.0300 -0.0294 -0.0486 -0.1945 1
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  Table 3 – Pooled Models  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels (two-tailed). 
This model comprises data for the total sample years from 2000 until 2006. 
The dependent variables are calculated with the following functional form: Ln (1 + Dependent Variable), due to the 
observations with zero values. 
The variable Post is a dummy variable, set equal to one if the observation is from 2006 or from after June 2005 and zero 
otherwise. 
The interaction variables of the explanatory variables with Post, can evaluate the change in relevance of an explanatory 
variable after the SFAS 123R effective date of impleentation. The significance of this type of variables can be 
measured by the t-value as a normal independent variable. The coefficient is given by the sum of the explanatory 
variable coefficient and the interaction variable co fficient. 
The Pooled Model without SFAS 123R transaction years (2003 and 2004) are suppressed for expositional convenience. 
Predicted Sign t-value Predicted Sign t-value Predicted Sign t-value
Intercept ? 0.255 0.20 ? -3.464 * -1.70 ? 2.179 *** 5.01
Access_Equity + -0.001 -0.01 ? -0.384 *** -2.95 ? 0.141 *** 3.23
Access_Debt + 1.049 ** 2.54 ? 0.782 0.99 ? 0.189 1.05
Cash_Cons + 0.392 0.65 + -0.929 -0.94 - -0.292 -1.35
Ln TLCF - 0.010 0.80 - -0.012 -0.61 - -0.002 -0.56
Age + -0.026 ** -2.33 + -0.048 *** -3.08 + 0.002 0.66
Service_Years + 0.005 1.08 + -0.025 *** -2.68 + -0.004 ** -1.96
Debt_Assets - -1.675 *** -3.04 - 1.059 1.24 - -0.523 *** -3.07
CEO_Ownership - -17.864 *** -4.82 - -10.272 *** -3.76 - -3.611 *** -4.69
EPS + 0.049 ** 1.99 + 0.047 1.45 + 0.024 ** 2.51
1YrReturn + -0.470 *** -3.17 + 0.393 *** 2.73 + 0.028 0.69
E_Index + -0.013 -0.22 - 0.097 0.88 + 0.001 0.06
Ln T_Assets + 0.505 *** 8.15 + 0.515 *** 4.92 + 0.392 *** 18.28
BMratio - -1.343 *** -4.17 - 0.338 0.87 - -0.516 *** -6.32
Rel_Investment - 1.199 0.95 - 0.783 0.35 - 0.668 1.45
Post - -7.984 *** -3.38 + 3.713 1.08 ? -0.842 ** -2.00
Access_Equity*Post - 1.505 ** 2.17 ? -0.278 -0.23 ? 0.064 0.42
Access_Debt*Post - -1.385 -0.80 ? 0.341 0.15 ? -0.447 -1.19
Cash_Cons*Post + 4.377 ** 2.16 + 0.160 0.06 - 0.492 1.42
Ln TLCF*Post - 0.041 * 1.67 - 0.066 * 1.91 - 0.009 ** 1.97
Age *Post + -0.009 -0.33 + 0.006 0.18 + 0.003 0.72
Service_Years*Post + -0.013 -1.37 + -0.019 -1.23 + -0.003 -1.27
Debt_Assets*Post - 0.407 0.39 - 0.989 0.74 - 0.518 *** 3.07
CEO_Ownership*Post - 25.682 *** 4.53 - -14.759 -1.52 - 4.414 *** 2.76
EPS*Post + 0.021 0.32 + -0.101 -1.49 + -0.004 -0.32
1YrReturn*Post + -0.792 -1.41 + 0.107 0.14 + 0.276 *** 2.82
E_Index*Post ? 0.097 0.74 ? -0.357 * -1.91 + 0.030 1.35
Ln T_Assets*Post + 0.410 *** 3.60 + -0.086 -0.48 + 0.025 1.21
BMratio*Post - -1.951 ** -2.22 - -0.648 -0.60 - -0.079 -0.65
Rel_Investment*Post - 5.389 * 1.74 - -10.319 ** -2.09 - -0.040 -0.08
Industry Dummies
Robust Cluster for Firms
Outliers Rstudent Correction
N
Adjusted R
2
2177 2463
0.2911 0.1273 0.4068
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
2356
Variables
Stock Options Restricted Stock Total Compensation
Dependent variable Ln Options Dependent variable Ln RS Dependent variable Ln T_Compensation
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Table 4 – Pre vs. Post-SFAS 123R Models  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Change Model for Performance Grants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels (two-tailed). 
The dependent variable in this model is the change between 2006 and 2003 of the variable Ln (1 + Options). The 
independent variables of the model are also the change between 2006 and 2003 and all the variables are defined as in 
Appendix A. 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels (two-tailed). 
The dependent variables are calculated with the following functional form: Ln (1 + Dependent Variable), due to the 
observations with zero values. 
 The Pre-SFAS 123R period is the mean of 2000, 2001 and 2002. The Post-SFAS 123R period comprises 2005and 2006 
mean values. 
t-value
Intercept -3.957 *** -4.78
Access_Equity 0.716 0.50
Access_Debt -2.392 -0.72
Cash_Cons 4.608 ** 2.42
Ln TLCF 0.180 *** 3.52
Age 0.038 *** 2.88
Service_Years -0.047 *** -3.11
Debt_Assets -5.703 *** -3.12
CEO_Ownership -18.112 ** -2.47
EPS 0.031 0.72
1YrReturn -1.627 *** -3.70
E_Index -0.326 -0.95
Ln Opt_Number
DV_Opt_Perf 2.233 ** 2.06
DV_RS_Perf 0.392 0.55
Ln T_Assets 0.126 0.17
BMratio -2.781 -1.63
Rel_Investment -9.845 * -1.87
Industry Dummies
Robust
Outliers Rstudent Correction
N
Adjusted R
2
367
0.1673
Variables
Change between 2006 and 2003
Coefficient
Yes
Yes
Yes
t-value t-value t-value t-value t-value t-value
Intercept -1.174 -0.68 -3.297 -1.19 -2.322 -1.01 0.026 0.01 0.991 * 1.71 2.151 *** 4.43
Access_Equity 0.311 1.01 2.013 * 1.85 -0.678 -1.52 -1.153 -0.57 0.335 *** 2.96 0.397 ** 2.49
Access_Debt 1.493 0.98 -3.168 * -1.72 1.380 0.52 0.184 0.06 -0.249 -0.44 0.358 0.94
Cash_Cons -1.367 -0.75 8.066 *** 3.48 -0.661 -0.30 1.119 0.40 -1.150 * -1.73 -0.941 *** -2.62
Ln TLCF -0.011 -0.60 0.040 1.63 -0.061 ** -2.48 0.039 1.04 0.002 0.36 0.007 * 1.76
Age 0.004 0.26 -0.042 * -1.71 -0.032 * -1.78 -0.060 * -1.75 0.010 * 1.76 0.000 -0.09
Service_Years 0.014 ** 2.07 -0.047 *** -2.89 -0.022 ** -2.12 -0.055 ** -2.08 -0.003 -1.16 -0.012 *** -4.10
Debt_Assets -1.562 ** -2.27 -1.792 -1.53 0.167 0.15 3.031 * 1.91 -0.479 * -1.88 -0.229 -1.15
CEO_Ownership -17.828 *** -3.95 11.890 * 1.77 -9.667 *** -3.32 -28.479 *** -4.36 -3.018 *** -3.07 0.788 0.41
EPS 0.041 0.94 0.101 1.38 0.044 0.90 -0.074 -0.82 0.034 ** 2.01 0.022 * 1.72
1YrReturn 1.208 *** 3.08 -3.161 *** -3.12 0.696 1.33 -0.423 -0.36 0.481 *** 3.25 0.312 ** 2.10
E_Index 0.045 0.60 0.026 0.20 0.004 0.04 -0.090 -0.47 -0.006 -0.22 0.023 1.04
Ln T_Assets 0.485 *** 5.70 0.716 *** 5.37 0.400 *** 3.46 0.412 ** 2.05 0.427 *** 14.35 0.396 *** 15.42
BMratio -1.305 *** -2.76 -3.254 *** -3.39 0.350 0.74 -0.726 -0.60 -0.297 ** -2.23 -0.605 *** -3.89
Rel_Investment 1.470 0.81 1.199 0.45 1.337 0.57 -5.955 -1.61 1.289 * 1.88 0.663 1.32
Industry Dummies
Robust 
Outliers Rstudent Correction
N
Adjusted R
2
Variables
Stock Options Restricted Stock Total Compensation
Dependent variable Ln Options Dependent variable Ln RS Dependent variable Ln T_Compensation
Pre-SFAS 123R Post-SFAS 123R Pre-SFAS 123R Post-SFAS 123R Pre-SFAS 123R Post-SFAS 123R
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.5089
360 365 365 383 366 372
0.2824 0.2427 0.1294 0.0658 0.5075
